Fatalism and an absence of public grief: the 1918-19 flu pandemic by Bayly, Martin
Fatalism	and	an	absence	of	public	grief:	the	1918-19
flu	pandemic
Although	the	‘Spanish	Flu’	killed	almost	a	quarter	of	million	Britons	–	many	young	–	it	went	uncommemorated.
Martin	Bayly	(LSE)	explains	how	British	society	attempted	to	deal	with	the	pandemic.
The	sheer	scale	and	devastation	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic	has	brought	renewed	attention	to	the	influenza
outbreak	of	1918-1919.	Closer	attention	reveals	both	continuities	and	discontinuities	between	the	two	cases.
Recent	work	by	LSE	academics	focusing	on	the	narration	by	policy	elites	of	such	‘mass	death’	events,	and	their
societal	impact,	offers	new	interpretations	of	the	1918-1919	pandemic.	In	particular,	this	reveals	the	importance	of
commemorating	the	losses	that	are	now	being	experienced	once	more.
The	‘Spanish	Flu’	pandemic	killed	an	estimated	228,000	in	the	UK,	making	1918	the	first	year	on	record	in	which
deaths	exceeded	births.	(‘Spanish	Flu’	was	a	misnomer.	Spain’s	neutrality	within	the	war	meant	that	its	press	was
not	subject	to	the	same	reporting	restrictions	and	were	among	the	first	to	report	influenza	cases,	giving	the
impression	it	originated	there.)	In	the	US,	an	estimated	death	toll	of	675,000	reduced	the	national	life	expectancy	by
12	years.	Elsewhere,	the	mortality	rate	was	staggering.	In	South	Africa,	the	relatively	small	population	suffered	a	toll
of	140,000	dead	–	mostly	non-Europeans.	Cape	Town,	it	was	said,	was	a	‘city	of	the	dead’,	with	the	Press
Association	reporting	that	some	‘native’	communities	had	been	entirely	wiped	out.	India	suffered	the	worst	toll,
compounded	by	an	ongoing	famine,	with	estimates	reaching	as	high	as	18.5	million	deaths.	Globally	more	than	one
quarter	of	the	world’s	population	contracted	the	virus.
‘The	Hun	is	beaten,	but	the	flu	isn’t’…	‘Everyone	don	a	mask	–	try	it’:	two	men	walk	through
Paris	urging	people	to	adopt	masks,	1	March	1919.	Photo:	Ninian	Reid	via	a	CC	BY	2.0
licence
The	origins	of	the	1918	pandemic	are	contested,	but	one	important	vector	was	undoubtedly	the	movement	of	troops
towards	the	latter	stages	of	the	First	World	War.	Military	bases	in	the	USA	that	supplied	troops	for	the	American
Expeditionary	Force	(AEF)	as	well	as	troop	contingents	in	Northern	France	have	been	identified	as	one	breakout
site.	More	recent	epidemiology	suggests	that	the	virus	was	in	circulation	in	the	two	years	immediately	preceding	the
pandemic.	The	pandemic	struck	the	UK	in	at	least	three	discernible	waves.	The	first,	in	the	spring	of	1918;	the
second,	and	most	deadly,	in	the	winter	of	1918;	and	the	third	wave	in	the	early	spring	of	1919.	However,
newspapers	continued	to	report	smaller	outbreaks	of	influenza	for	at	least	another	two	years,	and	localised
influenza	outbreaks	continued	to	be	reported	into	the	mid-1920s.
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Although	drawing	historical	parallels	between	then	and	now	is	tempting,	there	are	important	differences.	A	key
contextual	factor	shaping	the	public	and	political	response	to	the	pandemic	was	the	sheer	uncertainty	over	what	the
disease	was.	Some	senior	medical	practitioners	and	public	health	officials	had	experienced	the	earlier	‘Russian	flu’
of	1889-1892.	However	few	lessons	seemed	to	have	been	learned	in	the	interim;	indeed,	repeated	influenza
visitations	arguably	induced	a	degree	of	complacency.	Virology	remained	in	its	infancy	with	medical	science	tending
to	the	belief	that	influenza	was	a	bacterium.	This	was	significant	since	the	smallpox	epidemic	of	1901-1904	had
institutionalised	a	series	of	counter-measures	for	notifiable	infectious	diseases	–	including	vaccination	programmes.
Influenza,	however,	was	not	a	notifiable	disease	and	vaccinations	were	not	considered	a	worthwhile	preventive
measure,	despite	their	use	on	military	units.	Added	to	this,	19th	century	ideas	continued	to	shape	thinking,	with
notions	of	the	‘miasma’,	‘bad	air’,	or	‘ill	wind’	still	prevalent	in	both	received	wisdom	and	official	advice.
The	First	World	War	provides	perhaps	the	central	contextual	factor	shaping	the	official	response.	In	material	terms,
there	simply	were	not	the	resources	for	a	comprehensive	response.	The	war	in	Europe	diverted	medical
practitioners	away	from	the	UK.	Furthermore,	the	horrifying	scale	of	fatalities	as	a	result	of	the	war	had	normalised
death	in	such	a	way	as	to	induce	a	degree	of	fatalism	in	the	crisis	narrative.	Added	to	this,	in	the	absence	of
comparative	or	time-series	data,	the	public	were	given	few	tools	to	anticipate	the	future	course	of	the	outbreak,	nor
were	policy	elites	willing	to	regularly	narrate	the	chronology	of	deaths.	The	difference	to	today’s	slick	PowerPoint-
led	data-heavy	government	briefings	is	stark.	Certain	newspapers	and	public	figures,	including	those	within	the
medical	profession,	encouraged	the	idea	that	worrying	about	the	disease	would	increase	one’s	susceptibility	to
illness	and	even	weaken	the	nation’s	resolve	in	the	war	effort.	In	the	words	of	Sir	Arthur	Newsholme,	the	Chief
Medical	Officer	of	the	Local	Government	Board	(LGB),	the	national	circumstances	compelled	an	individual	duty	to
‘carry	on’.	The	prevailing	discourse	behind	the	onset	of	the	disease	was	therefore	not	one	of	a	‘war’	or	‘battle’,	as
with	some	of	the	rhetoric	surrounding	the	response	to	COVID-19.	Instead,	the	apparent	viciousness	of	the
influenza,	and	the	speed	at	which	it	developed	encouraged	the	language	of	an	‘attack’.
Despite	the	vectors	appearing	to	come	from	troop	movements,	there	was	only	occasional	blame	or	responsibility
accorded	to	soldiers.	Unawareness	of	how	the	virus	was	spread	meant	attribution	of	blame	tended	to	fall	on	a
failure	to	observe	proper	sanitary	habits.	One	frequent	target	of	blame	was	the	Local	Government	Board	as	the	only
organisation	capable	of	oversight	of	the	public	health	response	by	local	authorities.	Indeed,	the	absence	of	a
nationwide	public	health	body	provides	an	additional	distinction	with	the	present	crisis.	In	1918	the	Ministry	of
Health	did	not	exist;	it	came	into	existence	partly	as	a	response	to	the	pandemic	in	1919.	Public	health	was	the
responsibility	of	locally	appointed	Medical	Officers	of	Health	(MOHs),	the	Board	of	Education,	and	a	number	of	ad-
hoc	bodies.	This	decentralisation	of	public	health	generated	disaggregated	and	uneven	countermeasures	to
address	the	outbreak.	Whilst	the	proactive	MOH	at	Manchester,	James	Niven,	issued	a	public	advisory	as	early	as
June	1918	and	closed	schools,	this	was	far	from	standard	practice.	The	LGB	did	not	issue	blanket	advice	till	the
advent	of	the	second	wave	in	February	1919,	advising	‘healthy	living’,	well-ventilated	rooms,	warm	clothing,	and
gargling	with	a	solution	of	salt,	warm	water,	and	potassium	permanganate.	But	few	councils	reproduced	this
systematically.	Brandy	and	whiskey	remained	a	popular	remedy.
The	vagaries	of	death	reporting	was	an	additional	factor	that	shaped	the	public	response.	In	the	absence	of	a
Health	Ministry,	death	figures	were	collated	and	reported	at	the	local	and	regional	level	–	often	through	regional
newspapers	–	and	exhibited	uneven	practices.	Influenza’s	status	as	a	non-notifiable	disease	further	complicated
recording	of	deaths.	The	comorbidities	of	pneumonia,	bronchitis,	heart	disease,	and	phthisis	(tuberculosis),	were
often	reported	in	the	death	numbers	alongside	‘influenza’,	obscuring	the	deadliness	of	the	virus.	The	absence	of
viral	testing	meant	infection	rates	were	not	possible,	whilst	recovery	rates	were	not	reported.	The	virus	proved
disproportionately	deadly	to	adults	between	the	ages	of	25-34,	and	women	in	particular.	Whilst	the	gender	ratios
were	overlooked,	contemporary	discourse	privileged	the	deaths	of	the	young,	with	the	death	of	children
understandably	marked	out	as	particularly	tragic.	Other	communities	also	received	disproportionate	coverage	and
‘heroisation’	including	serving	police	officers,	health	workers,	and	soldiers.
The	final	area	in	which	we	can	see	lines	of	comparison	relates	to	the	practices	of	‘death	management’.	As	the		LSE
report	demonstrates,	the	management	of	death,	loss,	and	grief,	and	the	commemoration	or	non-commemoration	of
these	losses,	carries	with	it	the	potential	for	long-term	societal	effects.
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Funerals	were	not	banned	during	the	influenza	pandemic,	but	body	disposal	was	severely	impacted	by	overworked
undertakers,	gravediggers,	and	coffin	builders.	Conscription	led	to	a	shortage	in	grave	diggers	and	funeral	workers.
Even	a	shortage	of	horses	and	the	low-quality	feed	available	impacted	on	the	provision	of	ambulances	to	remove
the	deceased.	In	Sunderland,	for	example,	over	200	bodies	were	left	unburied	for	over	a	week.
Crucially	there	is	apparently	no	public	memorial	in	the	UK	to	the	1918-1919	influenza	pandemic.	This	reflects
international	practice,	with	New	Zealand	providing	one	exception.	The	ambivalence	of	the	state	to	influenza	deaths
despite	the	scale	of	loss	added	to	the	wartime	context	provides	an	explanation	for	the	absence	of	public	grief.	The
difference	that	public	commemoration	may	have	made	to	preparedness	in	later	pandemics	is	a	key	counter-factual
and	arguably	provides	one	of	the	most	compelling	‘lessons’	from	the	1918	pandemic.
Caution	must	be	taken	when	comparing	the	present	pandemic	with	the	1918	influenza	outbreak	in	the	UK.	The
wider	context	of	the	first	world	war	and	its	aftermath	was	key	in	downplaying	the	crisis	narrative.	Rhetoric	of	a	‘war’
against	the	virus	was	absurd	in	this	case.	Scholarship	has	pointed	to	‘war-weariness’	that	seemed	to	shape	the
fatalism	with	which	the	outbreak	was	faced,	but	wider	institutional,	material,	and	social	effects	are	apparent.	The
governing	apparatus	was	radically	different,	and	the	paucity	of	virology	expertise	was	decisive.	The	absence	of	an
overarching	health	ministry	created	a	disaggregated	and	uneven	public	health	response.	Rarely	was	the	crisis
grasped	by	governing	elites,	either	rhetorically,	or	in	practice.	Even	though	funerals	were	permitted,	the	sheer	pace
of	death	fostered	a	silencing	of	grief.	Less	acknowledged	in	the	literature	is	the	fact	that	the	devastation	visited	on
troops	was	also	silenced.	Fighting	men	were	permitted	a	hero’s	death	on	the	battlefield,	but	wartime	restrictions
meant	reporting	on	the	numbers	killed	by	influenza	was	scarce.
Crucially,	the	second	wave	of	the	pandemic,	which	was	more	deadly	than	the	first,	appeared	to	generate	more
outspoken	opinion	against	the	response	of	the	local	and	national	government.	In	the	medium	term,	newspapers
remained	alive	to	the	possibility	of	later	‘waves’	of	influenza	for	a	number	of	years,	demonstrating	the	long-tail
impact	of	the	pandemic	on	public	awareness.
The	way	in	which	societies	remember	is	not	always	a	deliberative	choice,	but	governments	do	have	options.	A
failure	to	commemorate	the	1918-19	pandemic	silenced	the	deaths	of	hundreds	of	thousands	of	people,	many	of
them	disproportionately	impacted	by	virtue	of	their	gender	or	socio-economic	status.	The	literature	on	war,	memory,
and	post-conflict	transition	shows	us	that	a	failure	to	commemorate	can	hold	long	term	implications	for	societal
cohesion.	But	a	failure	to	commemorate	1918-1919	also	left	the	country	ill-prepared	to	confront	the	next	pandemic
wave	of	1957,	and	now	the	COVID-19	pandemic	today.	Memorialising	the	loss	suffered	as	a	result	of	COVID-19
should	be	a	key	area	of	government	policy,	for	the	good	of	society,	and	to	ensure	the	hard-won	lessons	of	this
pandemic	are	not	lost	when	the	next	one	arrives.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	is	an	edited	extract
from	Confronting	the	COVID-19	Pandemic:	Grief,	Loss	and	Social	Order	(Department	of	International	Relations,
LSE).
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